How Candidates Can Signal Sincerity in an Era of Cynicism

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Principal investigators:

Scott Clifford

University of Houston

Email: scliffor@central.uh.edu

Homepage: https://scottaclifford.com/

Elizabeth Simas

University of Houston

Email: ensimas@uh.edu

Homepage: https://www.elizabethsimas.com/


Sample size: 769

Field period: 01/03/2020-06/26/2020

Abstract
Partisan polarization has reached historical highs, while politicians’ credibility has reached historical lows. For example, recent polls suggest that as few as 8% of Americans think that politicians believe most of the stances that they take on issues. This extreme level of cynicism threatens to break a fundamental link in representation. If candidates cannot credibly convey their positions, then voters cannot evaluate them on policy. Yet, we know little about the strategies politicians might take to convey the credibility of their claims. In this paper, we investigate whether politicians can signal credibility by taking extreme positions or by justifying their stances in moral terms. Across three experiments, we show that moral justifications tend to enhance credibility, while extreme positions do not. In a fourth study, we show that while extreme stances increase polarization in candidate ratings, moral justifications do not. Taken together, our findings suggest that moral justifications are a useful strategy to enhance credibility without contributing to rising levels of polarization.
Hypotheses
Experimental Manipulations
A within-subjects vignette experiment. Respondents will be asked to evaluate three hypothetical politicians, each taking a stance on a particular issue. Within each candidate profile, the stance will be randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2x2 design. The stance will be either extreme or moderate and moral or pragmatic.
Outcomes
An index of the following questions:
Summary of Results
As expected, the moral justification is perceived as significantly more credible than the pragmatic justification (b = .02, p = .002). The extreme position, on the other hand, is seen as slightly, but not significantly less credible than the more moderate position (b = -.007, p = .295). Thus, consistent with Study 1, moral justifications increase credibility, but extreme positions do not. Additionally, we find no evidence of an interaction between the treatments.
References
Paper presented at the the 2019 Texas American Politics Symposium (TAPS).