Do Women Make More Credible Threats? Gender Stereotypes and Crisis Bargaining

Download data and study materials from OSF

Principal investigators:

Christopher W. Blair

University of Pennsylvania

Email: cwblair@sas.upenn.edu

Homepage: http://www.chriswblair.com/

Joshua A. Schwartz

University of Pennsylvania

Email: josha@sas.upenn.edu

Homepage: https://web.sas.upenn.edu/josha/


Sample size: 2343

Field period: 07/26/2019-10/03/2019

Abstract
As more women attain executive office, it is important to understand how gender dynamics affect international politics. Toward this end, we present the first evidence that gender stereotypes affect leaders’ abilities to generate audience costs. Using survey experiments, we show that female leaders have political incentives to combat gender stereotypes that women are weak by acting “tough” during international military crises. Most prominently, we find evidence that female leaders, and male leaders facing female opponents, pay greater inconsistency costs for backing down from threats than male leaders do against fellow men. These findings point to particular advantages and disadvantages women have in international crises. Namely, female leaders are better able to tie hands—an efficient mechanism for establishing credibility in crises. However, this bargaining advantage means female leaders will also have a harder time backing down from threats. Our findings have critical implications for debates over the effects of greater gender equality in executive offices worldwide.
Hypotheses

Do women pay different audience costs than men?

H1a: Female leaders pay greater inconsistency costs compared to the male-male crisis dyad.

H1b: Female leaders pay lower belligerence costs compared to the male-male crisis dyad.

H2a: Male leaders facing female opponents pay greater inconsistency costs com- pared to the male-male crisis dyad.

H2b: Male leaders facing female opponents pay lower belligerence costs compared to the male-male crisis dyad.
Experimental Manipulations
To test our hypotheses, we designed and administered a 3 × 2 × 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment. The factors we varied are the United States’ crisis action (stay out, not engage, and engage); the US president’s gender; the foreign leader’s gender; and the US president’s partisan affiliation.
Outcomes
Our outcome measures are binary and seven-point Likert scales to measure approval or disapproval of the US president’s handling of the crisis.
Summary of Results
We fielded a survey experiment on a nationally representative sample of 2,342 Americans. Our goal was to estimate two types of public opinion costs that scholars can affect how leaders conduct foreign policy. The first type are called “inconsistency costs.” These are the domestic political punishments leaders pay for making a threat against a foreign adversary and then subsequently backing down. The second type are called “belligerence costs.” These are the political punishments leaders incur for making threats in the first place. To estimate these costs, we first presented all participants with a commonly used hypothetical international crisis in which a foreign country sends its military to take over a neighboring country. We then randomly assigned whether the U.S. president was male or female and Democratic or Republican. We then randomly assigned respondents to read one of three different scenarios for how he or she responds to the international crisis. The president either promises to stay out of the conflict and does so; threatens to send troops to resolve the crisis but fails to actually send troops (inconsistency), or threatens to send troops and follows through (belligerence). Finally, we asked respondents to what extent they approved or disapproved of the president’s handling of the crisis. Here’s what we found. We found that a female president who acted inconsistently by making a threat and then backing down faced about 20 percentage points more disapproval than a male president who acted the same way. Female presidents are also punished about 14 percentage points less than male leaders for making threats in the first place. Higher inconsistency costs mean a female president will find it politically more difficult to back down from threats, which could make it harder to de-escalate crises. Lower belligerence costs also mean women have incentives to initiate conflicts. However, there also potential advantages. If foreign leaders understand the domestic political incentives female leaders face, a female president’s threats will be more credible to foreign enemies, precisely because she is less likely to back down. This means women may actually be more effective at coercing foreign adversaries than men.
References
Schwartz, Joshua A., and Christopher W. Blair. 2020. "Do Women Make More Credible Threats? Gender Stereotypes, Audience Costs, and Crisis Bargaining." International Organization 72(3): 693–724.